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Extraterritorial Criminal Enforcement of 
Securities Fraud Regulations after United 
States v. Vilar1 
EDGARDO ROTMAN*  
In August 2013, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
in the case of United States v. Vilar denied extraterritorial 
application of the criminal law antifraud provisions con-
tained in the Securities Exchange Act. The specific object of 
this paper is to criticize this decision and negate its prem-
ises. 
                                                                                                             
 1 A German-language version of this paper was presented at the Max-Planck 
Institute for Criminal Law in Freiburg, Germany, on October 8, 2014. The Eng-
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in Florida, United States, on November 19, 2014. The paper draws from a chapter 
in a larger project about the internationalization of business-related criminal law. 
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After delving in depth into the notion of extraterritoriality, 
the paper offers a dynamic interpretation of the 1922 Su-
preme Court’s decision in United States v. Bowman, which 
is still the governing precedent on extraterritorial applica-
tion of criminal laws. Furthermore, the paper criticizes the 
application of the 2010 Supreme Court’s decision in Morri-
son v. National Australia Bank to criminal cases and ex-
plains the Dodd-Frank Act’s failed attempt to overrule it. 
The paper undertakes a detailed analysis of each of United 
States v. Vilar’s supporting arguments, using the German 
criminal law model to identify some of this decision’s signif-
icant shortcomings. The paper begins with a discussion of 
the extent and significance of the United States v. Bowman 
exception to the presumption against extraterritoriality in 
light of the need to protect the integrity of a delocalized cap-
ital market. Next, the paper interprets section 32(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act in accordance with modern devel-
opments of criminal law theory. Consequently, the paper an-
alyzes the significant distinctions between criminal and civil 
law in contrast with their equation by the Vilar court. The 
discussion ultimately leads to a justification of the Securities 
Exchange Act’s extraterritorial enforcement through a con-
textual and dynamic interpretation of section 32(a), taking 
into consideration the transnational nature of market integ-
rity and public wealth values protected by this provision. 
 
INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................55 
I. THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF EXTRATERRITORIAL ENFORCEMENT 
OF UNITED STATES CRIMINAL LAW IN THE PREVENTION 
AND REPRESSION OF FINANCIAL FRAUD ..................................56 
A. Evolution of the Notion of Extraterritoriality ....................56 
B. Extraterritoriality of Business-Related Criminal Law in 
a Globalized Economy .......................................................58 
C. The Pros and Cons of Extraterritorial Enforcement of 
Business-Related Criminal Law .........................................59 
II. OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES V. VILAR’S FUNDAMENTAL 
2015]EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITIES FRAUD 55 
 
PRECEDENTS ............................................................................64 
A. United States v. Bowman ...................................................64 
B. Morrison v. National Australia Bank .................................64 
C. Morrison’s Casualties ........................................................65 
D. The United States Congress’ Failed Attempt to 
Overrule Morrison .............................................................67 
III. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES V. VILAR ......................69 
A. United States v. Vilar .........................................................69 
B. How a Comparative Analysis of the German Criminal 
Law Model Can Help Identify Significant 
Shortcomings in United States v. Vilar ..............................70 
C. Discussion of Each of United States v. Vilar’s 
Supporting Arguments .......................................................71 
1.  FIRST CRITIQUE OF VILAR ...............................................71 
a. The extent and significance of the Bowman 
exception ..................................................................71 
b. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 
Called into Question ................................................73 
2. SECOND CRITIQUE OF VILAR ............................................77 
3. THIRD CRITIQUE OF VILAR ...............................................80 
4. FOURTH CRITIQUE OF VILAR ............................................89 
CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................92 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In August 2013, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
the case of United States v. Vilar denied extraterritorial application 
of the criminal law antifraud provisions contained in the Securities 
Exchange Act. The specific object of this paper is to criticize this 
decision and negate its premises. 
After delving in depth into the notion of extraterritoriality, the 
paper offers a dynamic interpretation of the 1922 Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. Bowman, which is still the governing 
precedent on extraterritorial application of criminal laws. Further-
more, the paper criticizes the application of the 2010 Supreme 
Court’s decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank to criminal 
cases and explains the Dodd-Frank Act’s failed attempt to overrule 
it. 
56 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:53 
 
The paper undertakes a detailed analysis of each of United States 
v. Vilar’s supporting arguments, using the German criminal law 
model to identify some of this decision’s significant shortcomings. 
The paper begins with a discussion of the extent and significance of 
the United States v. Bowman exception to the presumption against 
extraterritoriality in light of the need to protect the integrity of a de-
localized capital market. Next, the paper interprets section 32(a) of 
the Securities Exchange Act in accordance with modern develop-
ments of criminal law theory. Consequently, the paper analyzes the 
significant distinctions between criminal and civil law in contrast 
with their equation by the Vilar court. The discussion ultimately 
leads to a justification of the Securities Exchange Act’s extraterrito-
rial enforcement through a contextual and dynamic interpretation of 
section 32(a), taking into consideration the transnational nature of 
market integrity and public wealth values protected by this provi-
sion. 
I. THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF EXTRATERRITORIAL ENFORCEMENT OF 
UNITED STATES CRIMINAL LAW IN THE PREVENTION AND 
REPRESSION OF FINANCIAL FRAUD 
A. Evolution of the Notion of Extraterritoriality 
In the past, extraterritorial application of national criminal laws 
was very limited.2 Extraterritoriality grew with the emergence of 
                                                                                                             
 2 David Hume wrote that Scottish courts “are not instituted to administer 
justice over the whole world, but in our country, or a particular district of it only.” 
2 DAVID HUME, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF SCOTLAND RESPECTING CRIMES 
52 (1797), quoted in MICHAEL HIRST, JURISDICTION AND THE AMBIT OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 29 (Oxford U. Press 2003). John Austin considered extraterrito-
rial applications of jurisdictional rules “anomalous cases” in THE PROVINCE OF 
JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 355 (Prometheus Books 2000), cited by GÜNTHER 
HANDL, JOACHIM ZEKOLL & PEER ZUMBANSEN, BEYOND TERRITORIALITY: 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALISM 17 (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 2012). In MacLeod v. Attorney-General for New South Wales 
[1891] AC 455, 458 (Austl.), the court asserted that “all crime is local” and “the 
jurisdiction over the crime belongs to the country where the crime is committed.” 
With respect to the United States, Cedric Ryngaert points out that “[t]hroughout 
the history of US law, US courts have time and again pointed out the importance 
of the territorial principle.” CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 59 (2d ed. 2008). In their contributions to a book on the harmonization of 
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modern forms of globalization.3 In the field of securities laws, the 
comments to § 416 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations 
explain that “[a]s organized securities markets in different states are 
increasingly connected through electronic and institutional links,” 
territorial factors in the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction may be-
come less relevant and extraterritorial factors more important.4 
In early English common law, a court could not hear a case if 
any of what we currently call “elements of a crime” occurred outside 
of England.5 For example, in 1583, a murder committed on the fore-
shore came within the exclusive jurisdiction of the criminal admi-
ralty court only “because it occurred on the seabed owned, by the 
Crown under the Royal Prerogative . . . .”6 
In the United States, the notion of extraterritoriality experienced 
dramatic changes since its early formulation in the 1824 Appollon 
case.7 According to this decision, a nation is entirely precluded from 
extending its laws beyond its own borders, “except so far as regards 
its own citizens.”8 
In the present era of globalization, the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction has been deemed inevitable.9 “The expansion of com-
mercial and financial interstate links has increased the vulnerability 
                                                                                                             
criminal law, Mireille Delmas-Marty points out that the right to punish “is tradi-
tionally considered an emblem of national sovereignty,” and Mark Pieth expresses 
that he was astonished that criminal law is developing into one of the driving 
forces of harmonization of law “even though it was always considered a tradi-
tional stronghold of national sovereignty.” Mireille Delmas-Marty, Mark Pieth & 
Ulrich Sieber, Les Chemins De L’Harmonisation Pénale Harmonising Criminal 
Law, SOCIÉTÉ DE LEGISLATION COMPARÉE 19, 225 (2008). 
 3 For earlier historical precedents of globalization, see Edgardo Rotman, The 
Globalization of Criminal Violence, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 2, 38 (2000). 
 4 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 416 cmt. at 298 (1987). 
 5 Kenneth S. Gallant, What Exactly is “Extraterritorial Application” of a 
Statute?, JURIST Forum (May 28, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2271267. 
 6 Lacy’s Case (1583) 74 Eng. Rep. 246 (K.B.), cited in RALPH J. GILLIS, 
NAVIGATIONAL SERVITUDES: SOURCES, APPLICATIONS, PARADIGMS 76 (2007). 
 7 The Appollon, 22 U.S. 9 Wheat. 362 (1824). 
 8 Id. at 370. This exception was confirmed by JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN 
REGARDS TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES 22 (1834) (expressly stating 
that every nation has a right to bind its own citizens by its own laws in every place 
beyond its boundaries). 
 9 See RYNGAERT, supra note 2 at 187. 
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of States to adverse domestic effects of foreign activities.”10 In the 
field of securities law, the extraterritorial reach of national law may 
become necessary when some states set low standards to attract in-
vestors, refuse to criminalize certain fraudulent activities such as in-
sider trading, or avoid stringent corporate governance regulations.11 
There is a certain parallel between the evolution of American 
law and German law on the subject, especially in light of how these 
laws’ extraterritorial reach expanded from the end of the nineteenth 
century onwards. 
To understand this evolution, I turn to a late nineteenth-century 
classic text on extraterritoriality from Ernst Beling, one of the most 
prestigious German scholars of that period.12 In 1896, extraterrito-
rial questions were limited to the legal status of governments, diplo-
mats and their property, ships, and certain German representatives 
abroad.13 In sharp contrast, Peter Roegele’s 2014 book, significantly 
titled German Criminal Law Imperialism, shows how German crim-
inal law today applies extraterritorially in manifold ways.14 Global-
ization of crime, the intensification of interstate relations, and the 
need to protect transnational vital interests and values have deter-
mined the continuing expansion of German criminal law beyond its 
national borders since 1871.15 
B. Extraterritoriality of Business-Related Criminal Law in a 
Globalized Economy 
Although criminal law, as “the most parochial of legal disci-
plines,”16 has traditionally been a stronghold of territoriality, the 
challenge of transnational business crimes in today’s interconnected 
world requires the extraterritorial application of business-related 
criminal laws as an indispensable condition of their effectiveness. 
                                                                                                             
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 See generally ERNST BELING, DIE STRAFRECHTLICHE BEDEUTUNG DER 
EXTERRITORIALITÄT (1896). 
 13 See id. 
 14 See generally PETER ROEGELE, DEUTSCHER STRAFRECHTSIMPERIALISMUS: 
EIN BEITRAG ZU DEN VÖLKERRECHTLICHEN GRENZEN EXTRATERRITORIALER 
STRAFGEWALTAUSDEHNUNG (2014). 
 15 Id. at 2, 236. 
 16 Markus D. Dubber, Criminal Law in Comparative Context, 56 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 433, 433 (2006). 
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Globalization of financial markets, advances in communications 
and transportation technologies, decreasing relevance of national 
borders, emergence of computer networks, reduced state authority, 
increasing cyber finance and offshore banking, and high demand for 
American securities abroad and vice versa, have increased the po-
tential for transnational criminal securities fraud. 
The extraterritorial application of national laws constitutes an 
immediate response to such challenges. Other forms of internation-
alization of business-related criminal law that would presumably 
eliminate safe havens and prevent securities fraud are: a) interna-
tional treaties requiring an expanding number of nations to crimi-
nalize certain business crimes; b) preventive efforts by a number of 
international financial institutions and standard-setting, and trans-
governmental regulatory networks;17 and c) “soft law” harmoniza-
tion of national legislations eventually resulting in convergent na-
tional business-related criminal law systems. 
C. The Pros and Cons of Extraterritorial Enforcement of Business-
Related Criminal Law 
An inquiry into the normative aspects of extraterritorial enforce-
ment of geographically ambiguous statutes will facilitate the under-
standing of specific aspects of the Vilar decision. 
The extraterritorial application of criminal law provisions gov-
erning securities fraud raises significant normative issues relating to 
respect of the sovereignty of other nations and established principles 
of international law, such as non-intervention, comity, and sover-
eign equality.18 Also, such extraterritorial application may infringe 
upon the domestic constitutional principle of separation of powers.19 
Moreover, from the viewpoint of democracy, extraterritorial juris-
diction may impose national laws on foreign legal subjects who did 
not participate in their enactment.20 
                                                                                                             
 17 See Stephen Kim Park, Guarding the Guardians: The Case for Regulating 
State Owned Financial Entities in Global Finance, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 739, 740–
56 (2014); see also Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: 
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 28–35 (2002). 
 18 RYNGAERT, supra note 2, at 188. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
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However, as John C. Coffee, Jr. points out, curtailments of ex-
traterritoriality, when not expressly mandated by statutory provi-
sions, “miss much, and the unfashionable word—’extraterritorial’—
cannot be avoided.”21 He mentions four basic reasons that weigh 
heavily to support his conclusion: 1) the extreme mobility of major 
financial institutions and their ability to park abroad their high-risk 
operations, thus escaping the regulatory reach of their national legal 
systems; 2) because major financial institutions are “too intercon-
nected to fail,” regulation of systemic risk requires extending regu-
lations beyond domestic financial institutions to their foreign coun-
terparts as well; 3) the preference of some countries to keep “soft 
law” standards “aspirational and ineffable” because they profit from 
extremely risky unregulated havens; and 4) the assertion of extrater-
ritorial authority by the major financial nations as the best way to 
spur international bodies to develop a high consensus leading to 
meaningful “soft law” standards.22 
Another set of normative arguments supporting the extraterrito-
rial application of national statutes can be drawn from the customary 
international law justifications of extraterritoriality, especially from 
the protective principle. Transnational securities fraud may cause 
serious damage to the integrity of financial markets, affecting vital 
economic interests of a nation. Such territorial impact justifies the 
extraterritorial reach of national laws under international law. 
In addition, to support the extraterritoriality of securities fraud-
related criminal provisions, it is useful to draw from the area of com-
petition law: the extraterritorial reach of national criminal sanctions 
“enables states to protect their domestic market[s] from anti-com-
petitive activities which, while taking place elsewhere, adversely af-
fect the home jurisdiction.”23 This basic argument can be applied by 
analogy to the field of securities fraud. Also, here, extraterritoriality 
adds a deterrent effect by addressing violations unchallenged by the 
                                                                                                             
 21 John C. Coffee, Jr., Extraterritorial Financial Regulation: Why E.T. Can’t 
Come Home 3 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 236, 2014), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2347556. 
 22 Id. at 4–5. 
 23 Ariel Ezrachi & Jiří Kindl, Cartels as Criminal? The Long Road from Uni-
lateral Enforcement to International Consensus, in CRIMINALISING CARTELS: 
CRITICAL STUDIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY MOVEMENT 419, 424 
(Caron Beaton-Wells & Ariel Ezrachi eds., 2011). 
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home jurisdiction due to lack of legislation or enforcement pow-
ers.24 As in the case of competition law, “extraterritoriality of crim-
inal sanctions [for securities law violations] may supplement admin-
istrative procedures in other jurisdictions.”25 
In the area of competition law, the extraterritorial reach of anti-
trust prohibitions makes a conceptual contribution to the public per-
ception of the need for delivering markets from restrictive practices. 
In this respect, the extraterritorial application of competition law-
related criminal provisions has been praised for its export of “com-
petition values.”26 The extraterritorial application of securities 
fraud-related criminal provisions may similarly contribute to global 
consensus on a fair and efficient securities market. Furthermore, the 
extraterritorial application of criminal law provisions to countries 
operating in the global market force-feeds the criminalization 
agenda to jurisdictions that resist extraterritoriality.27 
Austen L. Parrish advocates resolving global challenges through 
multilateral agreements rather than through unilateral domestic ac-
tion. 28 He recognizes, however, that “[e]xtraterritorial regulation is 
not always a bad idea. In under-regulated areas, extraterritoriality 
can sometimes fill a gap. And it may be that extraterritorial regula-
tion can serve as a placeholder before more comprehensive interna-
tional agreement can be reached.”29 
Also, the rigid application of the presumption against extraterri-
toriality ignores some positive effects created by the extraterritorial 
application of United States law, such as “promot[ing] international 
negotiation and cooperation.”30 A similar, positive effect had been 
noted in the extraterritorial application of anti-bribery laws, based 
                                                                                                             
 24 See id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 425. 
 27 The idea of force-feeding is used in the field of competition law. See id. 
 28 Austen L. Parrish, Morrison, The Effects Test, and the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality: A Reply to Professor Dodge, 105 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 
399, 401–02 (2011). 
 29 Id. at 402. 
 30 William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Ar-
gument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 101, 163–68 (1998), cited 
by William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 
16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 117 (1998) (emphasis omitted) [hereinafter Presump-
tion Against Extraterritoriality]. 
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on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
on Combating Bribery of Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, by generating mechanisms that should help firms do 
ethical business and comply with this type of legislation.31 
Sarah C. Kaczmarek and Abraham L. Newman carried out an 
empirical study showing that extraterritorial application of the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act dramatically increases the likelihood that 
foreign countries enforce their own anti-bribery norms.32 Through 
econometric analysis, Kaczmarek and Newman determined that “the 
odds of a country enforcing its first [anti-corruption] case are twenty 
times greater if a country has experienced extraterritorial application 
of the [United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act].”33 By the same 
token, some pre-Morrison federal court decisions gave credit to the 
extraterritorial application of United States antifraud provisions for 
encouraging Americans to achieve a high standard of business ethics 
in the securities industry.34 
On the negative side, the extraterritorial application of business-
related criminal sanctions in one jurisdiction may undermine admin-
istrative or compliance programs in another.35 Also, extraterritorial 
application of this type of criminal norm may bring about a host of 
double-jeopardy problems.36 
Mireille Delmas-Marty warns that a unilateral expansion of in-
ternal law under the guise of combating impunity risks becoming an 
“internationalization of hegemonic type.”37 Also, Stephen Kim Park 
recognizes that the possibility of this unilateral extraterritorial reach 
                                                                                                             
 31 Branislav Hock, Intimations of Global Anti-Bribery Regime and the Effec-
tiveness of Extraterritorial Enforcement: From Free-Riders to Protectionism? 9 
(Tilburg Law & Econ. Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 2014-009, 2014), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2395156. 
 32 Sarah C. Kaczmarek & Abraham L. Newman, The Long Arm of the Law: 
Extraterritoriality and the National Implementation of Foreign Bribery Legisla-
tion, 65 INT’L ORG. 745, 760 (2011). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Erez Reuveni, Extraterritoriality as Standing: A Standing Theory of the 
Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Laws, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1071, 
1082 (2010). 
 35 Ezrachi & Kindl, supra note 23, at 425. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Mireille Delmas-Marty, Les Figures de L’Internationalisation en Droit Pé-
nal des Affaires: Aplanir le Terrain de Jeu, REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET 
DE DROIT PÉNAL COMPARÉ, 735, 737 (2005). 
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is “contingent on highly concentrated state power,”38 and that” the 
project[ion] [of a state’s] regulatory rules . . . depends on its status 
as an economic hegemon.”39 
While recognizing the superiority of multilateral solutions, the 
extraterritorial application of United States securities fraud-related 
criminal norms cannot be dismissed merely because of their charac-
terization as “hegemonic.” The immediate extraterritorial reach may 
be indispensable not only to protect investors and punish unscrupu-
lous manipulators, but ultimately to protect the integrity of financial 
markets intimately related to the protection of public wealth.40 For 
instance, market integrity has a constitutional rank in Italy as a con-
dition of the market economy. 41 In this regard, Salvatore Panagia 
believes that Article 41, section 2, in combination with Article 47 of 
the Italian Constitution, demonstrates that without criminal law pro-
tection of the integrity of financial markets against abuses and spec-
ulative excesses, these illegal abuses would not only destroy peo-
ple’s savings, but also the private will to invest.42 
The most damaging effects of securities fraud, like those of other 
business-related crimes, are that they create distrust toward the sys-
tem and its healthy components. Sutherland underscores that the 
most important damage resulting from white-collar crimes is the one 
caused in social relations by destroying trust, depressing social mo-
rale, and producing disorganization.43 Because public trust consti-
tutes the vital sapping of international commerce,44 an attack on it 
by white-collar crimes poses a challenge that justifies the extraterri-
torial application of national criminal laws. 
                                                                                                             
 38 Park, supra note 17, at 754. 
 39 Id. 
 40 FEDERICO CONSULICH, LA GIUSTIZIA E IL MERCATO: MITI E REALTÀ DI UNA 
TUTELA PENALE DELL’INVESTIMENTO MOBILIARE 405 (Dott. A. Giuffrè S.p.A. 
ed., 2010). 
 41 SALVATORE PANAGIA, LA TUTELA PENALE DEI MERCATI FINANZIARI: LA 
FATTISPECIE PENALE A RISCHIO DEFAULT 72 (G. Giappichelli ed. 2011). 
 42 Id. 
 43 EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 13 (1967). 
 44 EDGARDO ROTMAN, LOS FRAUDES AL COMERCIO Y A LA INDUSTRIA 30 
(1974). 
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II. OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES V. VILAR’S FUNDAMENTAL 
PRECEDENTS 
A.  United States v. Bowman 
In United States v. Bowman,45 the Supreme Court decided a 
fraudulent fuel oil claim brought by a United States-owned corpora-
tion for one of its ships. The fraud consisted of purchasing 1,000 
tons of fuel oil and delivering only 600 tons.46 The money paid for 
the undelivered 400 tons was then divided among four defendants.47 
Bowman—the  ship’s engineer—and the master concocted the fraud 
aboard the ship with the participation of two other co-conspirators 
based in Rio de Janeiro.48 
In Bowman, the Supreme Court established that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality does not apply to criminal statutes that are 
not “logically dependent on their locality for the government’s ju-
risdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the government to 
defend itself against obstruction, or fraud, wherever perpe-
trated . . . .”49 Limiting the locus of some criminal offenses, the 
Court explained, would greatly “curtail the scope and usefulness of 
the statute and leave open a large immunity for fraud[]” committed 
in a foreign country.50 In other words, Bowman held that the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality is not applicable when it under-
mines the statute’s purpose.51 
B. Morrison v. National Australia Bank 
In June 2010, the United States Supreme Court decided  
Morrison v. National Australia Bank,52 a case of obvious abuse of 
American judicial resources by Australian plaintiffs through a for-
eign-cubed53 securities fraud class action. As pointed out by Justice 
                                                                                                             
 45 260 U.S. 94 (1922). 
 46 Id. at 95. 
 47 Id. at 95–96. 
 48 Id. at 95. 
 49 Id. at 98. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 102. 
 52 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
 53 Foreign-cubed is defined as cases where there is a foreign plaintiff suing a 
foreign defendant for acts committed on foreign soil. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. 
Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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Stevens in his concurring opinion, the “case has Australia written all 
over it.”54 
Morrison significantly limited the extraterritorial scope of the 
antifraud provisions contained in section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act55 and SEC Rule 10(b)(5),56 finding that these provisions 
do not create a private right of action for foreign purchasers of for-
eign securities outside the United States.57 Prior to Morrison, the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit required that the alleged 
wrongful conduct had to have substantial effects in the United States 
in connection with securities and transactions abroad (“effects test”) 
or that sufficient fraudulent conduct occurred in the United States in 
connection with securities transactions abroad (“conduct test”).58 In 
Morrison, the Supreme Court knocked down nearly forty years of 
federal courts’ decisions, replacing their “conduct” and “effects” 
tests with a new “transactional” test, limiting the scope of section 
10(b) to causes of action that involve “only transactions in securities 
listed on domestic exchanges and domestic transactions in other se-
curities.”59 The Court applied a strict presumption against extrater-
ritoriality when the “focus” of the relevant statute occurred outside 
the territory of the United States. The Court concluded that the “fo-
cus” of the Exchange Act “is not on the place where the deception 
originated, but on purchases and sales of securities in the United 
States.”60 
C. Morrison’s Casualties 
Morrison left investors unprotected in a number of situations. 
As explained below, United States v. Vilar has compounded such 
flaws by depriving victims of criminal law protection. 
Some of these consequences are mentioned by Justice Stevens 
in his concurring opinion in Morrison. He gives the imaginary ex-
ample of an American investor buying shares of a foreign corpora-
tion that has a major American subsidiary with executives based in 
                                                                                                             
 54 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 286 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 55 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2012). 
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 57 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 273. 
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New York City.61 The executives mastermind a massive deception 
inflating the corporation’s stock, which is only listed on an overseas 
exchange, causing the price to plummet.62 To this situation Justice 
Stevens adds another imaginary one in which the same executives 
persuade an unsophisticated retiree in Manhattan, on the basis of 
material misrepresentations, to invest her life savings in the com-
pany’s doomed securities.63 Steinberg and Flannigan give a similar 
example of “a retiree, after being sold a doomed security in a door-
to-door sale by an executive of a foreign owned U.S. subsidiary, 
might be barred from bringing a section 10(b) action.”64 
A group of forty-two professors provide a list of dismissals of 
securities-fraud cases since Morrison, underscoring that this defi-
ciency in investor protection would not have happened with a “con-
duct” and “effects” test because these tests captured the potential 
complexity of the relationships among investors and issuers.65 
Among these cases, I highlight one of a Norwegian securities firm 
and seven Norwegian municipalities that brought suit against vari-
ous Citigroup entities.66 This case concerned the sale of fund-linked 
notes that were issued and traded outside the United States, but were 
structured, arranged, and managed in the United States by 
Citigroup’s New York subsidiaries.67 Applying the conduct test, the 
district court found that the essential core of the alleged fraud oc-
curred in New York.68 Six months later, after the Supreme Court 
decided Morrison, the district court reversed its previous decision 
and granted defendant’s motion to dismiss because the fund-linked 
notes were listed on European stock exchanges, notwithstanding the 
                                                                                                             
 61 See id. at 285 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 62 See id. 
 63 See id. 
 64 Marc I. Steinberg & Kelly Flanagan, Transnational Dealings—Morrison 
Continues to Make Waves, 46 INT’L LAW. 829, 863–64 n.304 (2012). 
 65 Comments from Robert P. Bartlett et al., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, 
Securities and Exchange Commission 13–18, (Feb. 18, 2011), 
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 66 See Terra Secs. ASA Konkursbo v. Citigroup, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 2d 441 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 67 See id. at 444–45. 
 68 See Terra Secs. ASA Konkursbo v. Citigroup, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 2d 303 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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fact that the essential core of the alleged fraud occurred in New 
York.69 
It is noteworthy that in transnational securities fraud cases cov-
ered in the past by circuit courts’ “conduct” and “effects” tests, in 
both situations something happens in the United States, and there-
fore, Congress has an interest in them, and a presumption against 
such interest is unfounded.70 Precisely this circumstance is appro-
priately expressed in one of the earliest securities fraud Second Cir-
cuit decisions, where Judge Friendly pointed out “[t]he New Yorker 
who is the object of fraudulent misrepresentations in New York is 
as much injured if the securities are of a mine in Saskatchewan as in 
Nevada” and “that Congress would have wished protection to be 
withdrawn merely because the fraudulent promoter of the Saskatch-
ewan mining securities took the buyer’s check back to Canada and 
mailed the certificate from there.”71 This is precisely one of the sit-
uations deprived from protection in Morrison.72 Federal courts 
adopted Judge Friendly’s position for four decades without congres-
sional reaction, while Morrison’s interpretation lasted less than four 
weeks until the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro-
tection Act attempted to reinstate both the “conduct” and the “ef-
fects” test for actions brought by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (“SEC”) and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”). 
D. The United States Congress’ Failed Attempt to Overrule 
Morrison 
Morrison left ambiguous the SEC and DOJ’s authority to bring 
extraterritorial actions under § 10(b). In July 2010, Congress ad-
dressed this issue in sections 929P(b) and 929Y of the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act; the most im-
portant financial reform legislation since 1934.73 These norms grant 
the SEC and DOJ jurisdiction over conduct within the United States 
                                                                                                             
 69 See Terra Secs. ASA Konkursbo, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 444–47. 
 70 John H. Knox, The Unpredictable Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 
40 SW. L. REV. 635, 648 (2011). 
 71 Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1336–
37 (2d Cir. 1972), cited by id. 
 72 Knox, supra note 70. 
 73 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111–203, tit. IX, §§ 929P(b), 929Y (2010). 
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that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even 
if the securities transactions occur outside the United States and in-
volve only foreign investors, or conduct occurring abroad that has a 
foreseeable, substantial effect within the United States.74 In other 
words, Congress provided extraterritorial jurisdiction for SEC and 
DOJ actions under § 10(b) by using a “conduct” and “effects” test 
similar to the one used by the federal courts before Morrison. 
Representative Paul Kanjorski, chairman of the committee that 
drafted the Dodd-Frank Act sections 929P(b) and 929Y in Title IX, 
in his floor statement, expressed that the purpose of the reform was 
to grant authority to the SEC and DOJ to bring civil or criminal en-
forcement proceedings involving transnational securities fraud un-
der both the “conduct” and the “effects” tests developed by the 
courts regardless of the jurisdiction of the proceedings.75 Address-
ing the very recent Supreme Court decision in Morrison, Repre-
sentative Kanjorski reaffirmed that the bill’s provisions concerning 
extraterritoriality are intended to rebut the presumption against ex-
traterritoriality “by clearly indicating that Congress intends extrater-
ritorial application in cases brought by the SEC or the Justice De-
partment.”76 
Conversely, George T. Conway III, the lawyer who argued and 
won the Morrison case for the defendant, concluded that section 
929P(b) does not rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality 
because the provision addresses only the “jurisdiction” of the “dis-
trict courts of the United States” to hear cases involving extraterri-
torial elements.77 Conway points out that the drafters of the Dodd-
Frank Act ignored that in the Morrison decision the Supreme Court 
reiterated the long-standing principle that the territorial scope of a 
federal law does not present a question of jurisdiction, but rather a 
question of substance.78 
                                                                                                             
 74 See id. 
 75 156 CONG. REC. H5237 (daily ed. Jun. 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. 
Kanjorski). 
 76 See id. 
 77 George T. Conway III, Extraterritoriality After Dodd-Frank, THE 
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL 
REGULATION (Aug. 5, 2010), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/08/05/ extra-
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 78 See id.; see also Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, The Aftermath of 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank and Elliott Associates v. Porsche, 8 EUR. 
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David He considers it unlikely that any lower court would inter-
pret the statute in contradiction with Congress’s objectives “because 
it is clear that Section 929P(b) intended to reinstate the conduct and 
effects approach for civil and criminal enforcement actions brought 
by the government against overseas violators . . . .”79 In addition, He 
cites Painter,80 expressing that “[m]ost judges will not be willing to 
tell Congress that, because of the way a statute is worded, it fails to 
accomplish anything at all.”81 
If the SEC were free from Morrison’s jurisdictional limitations 
in civil actions, as the Dodd-Frank Act intended, the SEC investiga-
tions and DOJ prosecutions of criminal violations of the Securities 
Acts would unquestionably be free from the same restrictions. This 
paper challenges the Vilar decision that extends the Morrison juris-
dictional limitations to criminal cases. Vilar implicitly assumes that 
the Dodd-Frank Act was ineffective. If the Dodd-Frank Act were 
effective, Vilar would become irrelevant. 
III. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES V. VILAR 
A. United States v. Vilar 
In United States v. Vilar, appellants Alberto Vilar and Gary Alan 
Tanaka were convicted of securities fraud, securities investment 
fraud, and conspiracy, and they were sentenced respectively to 108 
and 60 months of imprisonment, required to pay $35 million in res-
titution, and ordered to forfeit $54 million.82 Exploiting their posi-
tions as prominent investment managers and advisors, Vilar and 
Tanaka solicited millions with the promise of investing the funds in 
predominantly safe, short-term deposits, but instead invested the 
money in highly volatile technology and biotechnology stocks.83 
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 82 United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62 (2nd Cir. 2013). 
 83 See id. at 68. 
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The dot-com bubble burst of 2000 led to the precipitous fall of their 
investment.84 In the midst of the catastrophe, they obtained $5 mil-
lion dollars from a client by deceiving her with the false promise of 
an illusionary investment, while actually embezzling the entrusted 
funds to meet various personal and corporate obligations.85 In this 
case, the Second Circuit held that securities fraud prohibitions sec-
tion 10(b)86 and Rule 10b-587 do not apply extraterritorially in crim-
inal cases.88 I will analyze the supportive reasons for this conclusion 
step-by-step in the critical analysis below. The German criminal law 
model plays a pivotal role in this analysis. 
B. How a Comparative Analysis of the German Criminal Law 
Model Can Help Identify Significant Shortcomings in United States 
v. Vilar 
The German model consists of a set of abstract criminal law cat-
egories adopted by most of continental Europe, Latin America, and 
diverse parts of the world. This model is based on a comprehensive 
and consistent methodology that “lends itself to application to any 
system of criminal law regardless of its legislative foundations.”89 
Traditionally, German jurisprudence is regarded as a science 
that shares the scientific status of the social and behavioral sci-
ences.90 Indeed, a prominent Spanish criminal law scholar considers 
the German system of criminal law to be an achievement of the hu-
man sciences.91 
The use of a foreign model is justified by the paucity of catego-
rizations existing within the common law to resolve issues presented 
                                                                                                             
 84 See id. 
 85 See id. at 68–9. 
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by the Vilar case. This conceptual dearth is decried by a number of 
American scholars. I will draw on the German model to develop my 
critical analysis of Vilar and include references to American schol-
ars’ complaints about insufficiencies of United States law in this 
field. 
C. Discussion of Each of United States v. Vilar’s Supporting 
Arguments 
In the following sections I will cite in bold characters the rele-
vant parts of the Vilar decision, followed by my respective rebuttal. 
1.  FIRST CRITIQUE OF VILAR 
“[T]he presumption against extraterritoriality applies to 
criminal statutes, and section 10(b) is no exception.”92 
a. The extent and significance of the Bowman exception 
The Bowman decision excludes the presumption against extra-
territoriality, as already explained, in criminal statutes that are not 
logically dependent on their locality for the government’s jurisdic-
tion, but are enacted because of the right of the government to de-
fend itself against obstruction or fraud, wherever perpetrated. 
Relying on some lower court decisions, the government claimed 
in the Vilar case that Bowman excluded the presumption against ex-
traterritoriality in all criminal law cases.93 The Vilar court accu-
rately rejected this incorrect interpretation.94 Indeed, the Bowman 
decision excludes the presumption against extraterritoriality only in 
some cases.95 
However, the Vilar court grievously misinterprets Bowman by 
excessively narrowing its exception to the point of making it inop-
erative. The Vilar court’s erroneous interpretation of Bowman con-
sists of limiting the exception to self-defense from attacks against 
government representatives or government property.96 Indeed, the 
Bowman exception to the presumption against extraterritoriality also 
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applies to governmental functions and to the vital social interests 
and goals served by the government. 
To demonstrate the correctness of this argument, I will start with 
a grammatical interpretation. According to the 1922 Bowman deci-
sion, a limitation of the locus of some crimes to the strictly territorial 
jurisdiction would greatly “curtail the scope and usefulness of the 
statute and leave open a large immunity for frauds as easily commit-
ted” in foreign states as in the United States.97 Furthermore, the de-
cision refers only to criminal statutes “enacted because of the right 
of the Government to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud 
wherever perpetrated . . . .”98 
The Bowman exception to the presumption against extraterrito-
riality should not be limited to natural persons that represent the 
government or to the government’s property, but should be extended 
to the government’s functions as well as to its vital interests and 
goals. In a democratic system, the government is a means to achieve 
highly important social interests. This teleological interpretation is 
also confirmed by the Bowman decision when it uses the word “ob-
structions.”99 The word “obstructions” clearly refers to governmen-
tal functions.100 This interpretation is also confirmed by the exam-
ples provided in the Bowman decision as cases in which “Congress 
has not thought it necessary to make a specific provision in the law 
that the locus shall include the high seas and foreign countries, but 
allows it to be inferred from the nature of the offense.”101 For in-
stance, “bribing a United States officer of the civil, military or naval 
service to violate his duty or to aid in committing a fraud on the 
United States.”102 
It is also important that the Bowman decision was later used to 
protect higher governmental interests, such as the environment and 
the integrity of insolvency procedures. Consider the Skiriotes v. 
Florida103 decision. In this case, the Florida statute forbidding the 
use of diving equipment for the purpose of taking commercial 
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sponges from waters within Florida’s territorial limits was applied 
extraterritorially on the basis that the United States is not limited by 
any rule of international law from extending its laws extraterritori-
ally to protect vital national interest such as natural resources.104 
This happens on the high seas and in foreign countries, provided that 
the rights of another nation or its nationals are not infringed. 
In Stegeman v. United States,105 the Stegemans were convicted 
of having transferred property from the state of Oregon to Canada 
after filing a petition in bankruptcy, thus knowingly and fraudulently 
concealing property belonging to the bankruptcy estate.106 The court 
considered that, as in Bowman, “Congress has not thought it neces-
sary to make a specific provision in the law that the locus shall in-
clude the high seas and foreign countries, but allows it to be inferred 
from the nature of the offense.”107 On this basis, the court considered 
that Congress enacted section 18 U.S.C. § 152 to serve important 
governmental interests and “not merely to protect individuals who 
might be harmed by the prohibited conduct.”108 
Under the exceptions to the presumption against extraterritorial-
ity, my interpretation of Bowman therefore encompasses the crimi-
nal law provisions protecting the integrity of capital markets. Be-
cause of today’s interconnectedness of capital markets through elec-
tronic and institutional links, the importance of their location plays 
such a reduced role that one can no longer speak of “local” markets. 
The globalization of capital markets requires a global system of in-
vestment protection; as long as this does not exist, the extraterritorial 
application of American legal provisions remains necessary. 
b. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Called into 
Question 
Another line of arguments questions the merit and value of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, which was challenged by 
some scholars after the 2010 Morrison decision. In fact, these pub-
lications followed an article published in 2010 by John H. Knox in 
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the American Journal of International Law.109 Knox made a pains-
taking historical analysis of the presumption against extraterritorial-
ity, showing its changing underlying rationale through time, and 
pointing to its contradictions and incoherent application by the 
United States federal courts.110 Dissatisfied with these jurispruden-
tial inconsistencies, he proposed a new interpretive canon—a pre-
sumption against “extrajurisdictionality,” the most predictable of the 
possible options.111 
Knox looked into the bases of jurisdiction under international 
law. In those cases where the United States has sole or primary ju-
risdiction, the courts are free to construe statutes without any pre-
sumption against their application.112 When international law pro-
vides United States courts with only some basis of jurisdiction, the 
courts should apply a soft presumption against the application of the 
statute—that is, allow the courts to overcome it by indication of a 
legislative intent to do so.113 It is only when the United States en-
tirely lacks any basis of jurisdiction under international law that a 
strict presumption against application of the law should be over-
come by only express and clear legislative statement.114 
In a subsequent 2011 article,115 Knox addressed the Morrison 
decision, rebutting its claim that the presumption against extraterri-
toriality provides “a stable background against which Congress can 
legislate with predictable effects.”116 He explained how Morrison 
“exacerbated longstanding confusions in the Court’s treatment of 
extraterritoriality” and noted that “virtues of a presumption against 
extrajurisdictionality are illustrated by the very circuit court deci-
sions that Morrison rejected.”117 Knox renewed his proposal for a 
presumption against extrajurisdictionality, underscoring the need to 
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return to the roots of the presumption in the international law of leg-
islative jurisdiction118 to bring the Supreme Court jurisprudence 
back “into coherence and in better alignment with reasonable as-
sumptions of congressional intent. . . .”119 
Knox pointed out that the Supreme Court showcased the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality as predictable and stable; when 
in the Supreme Court’s hands, however, the presumption was used 
neither predictably nor stably. He underscored that the Court missed 
the opportunity to resolve the ambiguity regarding extraterritorial 
actions that affects the United States, compounding the confusion 
by emphasizing the “focus”120 of the statute in determining its ex-
traterritorial reach.121 
More recently, Zachary D. Clopton challenges the validity and 
meaningfulness of the presumption against extraterritoriality and 
proposes to replace it altogether.122 Clopton makes an inventory of 
all the purported justifications of the presumption against extraterri-
toriality and concludes that none of them hold water.123 These justi-
fications from courts and scholars are based primarily on the need 
to avoid foreign conflicts and Congress’ overriding concern with 
domestic conditions.124 To a lesser degree, other justifications in-
clude the need to affirm the principle of separation of powers by 
avoiding judicial activism and the prevention of due process viola-
tions through extraterritorial suits.125 
Clopton analyzes in depth each of these purported justifications, 
showing that they are weakened by contradictory judicial decisions 
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and that these decisions reveal “the presumption is poorly attuned to 
either of these laudable goals.”126 
It is significant for the purposes of my argument that Clopton 
negates the absolute and immutable status of the presumption pred-
icated by the Morrison decision, reminding us that the presumption 
is a relative tool of federal statutory interpretation and not a consti-
tutional principle.127 In fact, Clopton indicates the possibility of re-
placing it altogether.128 
It is equally important that Clopton emphasizes that the rules re-
garding extraterritoriality should be different for civil, administra-
tive, and criminal statutes.129 It is disappointing, however, that Clop-
ton’s proposed replacement for the presumption against extraterri-
toriality in criminal cases happens to be the rule of lenity,130 a rule 
of interpretation that, though important within its narrow ambit of 
application, cannot be generalized to all cases of extraterritorial ap-
plication of criminal law. The Supreme Court explains, “[t]he rule 
of lenity applies only if, ‘after seizing everything from which aid 
can be derived,’ [a court] can make ‘no more than a guess as to what 
Congress intended.’”131 It is necessary to distinguish the external 
geographical ambiguity of the field of application of a criminal stat-
ute from the intrinsic ambiguity relating to the prohibition and pen-
alties contained in the definition of the criminal offense. Here, we 
are not dealing with an intrinsic grievous ambiguity of a criminal 
statute, but with a situation in which the extraterritorial purpose of 
the statute, although implicit, is clear and obvious to a point that 
makes it unnecessary to spell out. 
The cases covered by the Bowman exception to the presumption 
against extraterritoriality interpret statutory silence in situations 
where the unexpressed statutory purpose is clear.132 Without this 
                                                                                                             
 126 Id. at 1. 
 127 See id. at 3–8. 
 128 Id. at 21. 
 129 Id. at 22–45. 
 130 Id. at 30–31. 
 131 Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995) (quoting Smith v. United States, 
508 U.S. 103, 108 (1993) and Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958)). 
 132 See cases cited by Ellen S. Podgor & Daniel M. Filler, International Crim-
inal Jurisdiction in the Twenty-First Century: Rediscovering United States v. 
Bowman, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 589 (2007). 
2015]EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITIES FRAUD 77 
 
provision, a misguided rule of lenity would eliminate all extraterri-
toriality of statutes that omit an express mention of their obvious 
purpose of extraterritorial application across-the-board, including 
the Bowman situation. Keeping the presumption against extraterri-
toriality limited by the exception introduced by United States v. 
Bowman is a more adequate solution. 
2. SECOND CRITIQUE OF VILAR 
The Supreme Court has already interpreted Sec-
tion 10(b), and it has done so in unmistakable 
terms: ‘Section 10(b) reaches the use of a manip-
ulative or deceptive device or contrivance only in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a security 
listed on an American stock exchange, and the 
purchase or sale of any other security in the 
United States.’ To permit the government to pun-
ish extraterritorial conduct when bringing crimi-
nal charges under Section 10(b) ‘would estab-
lish . . . the dangerous principle that judges can 
give the same statutory text different meanings in 
different cases.’133 
Refusing to apply Morrison’s decision to the criminal enforce-
ment of securities fraud is not giving a statutory text two different 
meanings. Indeed, we speak about two different rules within the 
same statute. 
Section 10(b),134 in itself, is no more than a private law prohibi-
tion. It is only when this behavior is carried out “willfully” that it 
becomes part of the criminal law definition contained in section 
32(a).135 Section 32(a) is the proper criminal law norm.136 It estab-
lishes a serious criminal penalty and the conditions that the conduct 
has to meet in order to become criminal.137 
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The court in Vilar ignored that section 32(a) contains the defini-
tion of the crime, while section 10(b) generates only civil and ad-
ministrative responsibilities, playing only a supplementary role 
when it is incorporated by reference into a criminal law rule to com-
plete section 32(a)’s definition.138 
Here, among other instances, the German criminal law model 
provides an answer to an American legal question. In the present 
case, the answer comes from the category of blanket criminal norms. 
Incorporation by reference into a criminal norm has received con-
siderable doctrinal development in countries belonging to the civil 
law system.139 The doctrine of blanket criminal laws (Blankettstraf-
gesetze, leyes penales en blanco, leggi penali in bianco) basically 
consists of a special case of legislative drafting techniques that entail 
the incorporation by reference of a norm existing elsewhere in the 
legal system to complete a criminal provision.140 Karl Binding 
coined the word Blankettstrafgesetze (Blanket criminal laws) in his 
trailblazing work, Die Normen und ihre Übertretung (Norms and 
their Transgression). In the first volume of his 1922 five-volume 
edition, he defined blanket criminal laws as those that contained 
only the sanction and referenced a number of statutes and adminis-
trative or police regulations to complete the precept.141 Until such 
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cle 334 of the Colombian Penal Code: “Whoever, without the permission of a 
competent authority or infringing existing norms, performs, experiments, intro-
duces or propagates animals, vegetables, or hydro-biological species, or bio-
chemical or biological agents that endanger the health or existence of those spe-
cies or alter the animal or vegetable population will be punished with imprison-
ment of two to six years and a fine of 50 to 200 minimum monthly salaries.” 
 141 1 KARL BINDING, DIE NORMEN UND IHRE ÜBERTRETUNG: EINE 
UNTERSUCHUNG ÜBER DIE RECHTMÄSSIGE HANDLUNG UND DIE ARTEN DES 
DELIKTS, 161–62 (Scientia Verlag Aalen ed., 4th ed. reprint 1965) (1922). 
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secondary rules are enacted, the blanket law is “like a wandering 
body searching for its soul.”142 Further development of this doctrine 
included in the category of blanket criminal laws the incorporation 
by reference of provisions existing within the same statute. In 1931, 
Edmund Mezger expanded the concept of blanket criminal law to 
include situations where the same body of law contains the precept 
in another section.143 These cases are called improper blanket crim-
inal laws and cover precisely the situation of the Securities Ex-
change Act.144 This category plays a central role in business-related 
criminal law,145 where the application of blanket statutes is not only 
frequent, but is also typical.146 An example of the completion of a 
blanket provision is § 3 of the German Law about business crimes 
(WiStG) dealing with the regulation of prices,147 as well as with 
laws regulating wine (WeinG).148 This theory perfectly applies to 
the Securities Exchange Act, where section 32(a) is the blanket 
criminal law norm that incorporates by reference section 10(b). 
As a subsidiary argument, I underscore the relativity of the uni-
tary principle invoked by the Vilar court; that is, both civil and crim-
inal liabilities should be dealt with in the same way when they arise 
from the same statute.149 In addition, as Jonathan Siegel recognizes, 
it is impossible to anticipate every possible circumstance in which a 
canon of construction might someday apply.150 “It is an error to be-
lieve that the process of statutory interpretation can ever be mecha-
nized or reduced to a set of determinate, nondiscretionary rules.”151 
Furthermore, in United States v. Nippon Paper Industries, Circuit 
Judge Lynch expressed in his concurring opinion that sometimes the 
                                                                                                             
 142 Id. at 162. 
 143 EDMUND MEZGER, STRAFRECHT: EIN LEHRBUCH 196 (Verlag von 
Duncker & Humblot, 3d ed. 1949). 
 144 See id. 
 145 KLAUS TIEDEMANN, WIRTSCHAFTS-STRAFRECHT: EINFÜHRUNG UND 
ALLGEMEINER TEIL MIT WICHTIGEN RECHTSTEXTEN 87 (Verlag Franz Vahlen ed., 
4th ed. 2014). 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. at 54. 
 148 Id. at 56. 
 149 See generally United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 150 Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in 
Statutory Interpretation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 339, 394 (2005). 
 151 Id. 
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same language in a statute should not necessarily be read the same 
way in all contexts to which the language applies: “New content is 
sometimes ascribed to statutory terms depending upon context.”152 
In Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., the Supreme Court explained that, de-
pending on context, a statutory term might have different meanings 
in different sections of a single statute.153 Furthermore, Justice Ste-
vens has repeatedly recognized that the same word can have differ-
ent meanings in the same statute.154 
3. THIRD CRITIQUE OF VILAR 
I will next address the third ground of the Vilar decision. The 
government contended that section 10(b) had different requirements 
in private law and criminal law; therefore, they should be interpreted 
in a different way.155 The “government observe[d] that only private 
plaintiffs must prove reliance, economic loss, and loss causation, 
whereas only the government (in criminal cases) must prove that the 
fraud was committed willfully.”156 Here is the Vilar response fol-
lowed by my critique: 
Critically, however, none of these differences re-
late to the conduct proscribed by Section 
10(b) . . . . As for the element of willfulness in 
criminal cases, it comes directly from Section 32 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which per-
mits criminal liability to attach to a violation of 
Section 10(b), only when the violation is willful. 
But like the elements relevant only to private 
plaintiffs, the requirement of proving willfulness 
has nothing to do with the text or interpretation 
of Section 10(b). In other words, Section 32 pro-
vides no basis for expanding the conduct for 
                                                                                                             
 152 United States v. Nippon Paper Indus., 109 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 153 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 343–44 (1997). 
 154 See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 595 (2004); see also 
United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 525 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 155 United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 75 (2nd Cir. 2013). 
 156 Id. 
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which a defendant may be held criminally liable 
under Section 10(b).157 
This is another instance in which the contribution of the German 
criminal law model is fundamental. We concede that the conduct 
described in section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act,158 when 
read in isolated from Section 32(a),159 as a description of the exter-
nal phase of a behavior, is the same for criminal and private law. 
This external conduct corresponds in German law only to the objec-
tive phase of the definition.160 The same external conduct, however, 
gains full significance when it is incorporated into a criminal law 
norm.161 Criminalization operates as King Midas. In the same way 
that everything King Midas touched became gold, criminalization 
changes the nature of the behavior it addresses. While the traditional 
understanding of United States common law is that conduct relevant 
to criminal law is basically “a willed muscular contraction,”162 this 
naturalistic notion of human action has long been abandoned in the 
majority of civil law countries.163 Following the German criminal 
                                                                                                             
 157 Id. 
 158 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2012). 
 159 15 U.S.C § 78ff (2012). 
 160 Modern developments in criminal law theory following the German model 
structure the definition of the criminal offense in two phases: an objective and a 
subjective. See, e.g. 1 ENRIQUE CURY URZÚA, DERECHO PENAL, PARTE GENERAL 
278–79, 294 (Editorial Juridica De Chile, 2d ed. 1992). 
 161 When a certain behavior is criminalized, its statutory definition entails a 
negative judgment value, technically called the “disvalue of the action.” See 
HANS-HEINRICH JESCHECK & THOMAS WEIGEND, LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS 
ALLGEMEINER TEIL 238–46 (Dunker & Humblot Berlin 1996). 
 162 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN, 
COMPARATIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL, VOLUME 1: FOUNDATIONS 269 (Oxford U. 
Press 2007) [hereinafter GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW]; see also GEORGE P. 
FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 44–46, 50–53 (Oxford U. Press 
1998) [hereinafter BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW]. 
 163 See definition of “civil law system” in footnote 139. Some examples of 
scholarship from the numerous civil law countries where a naturalist notion of 
conduct was overcome are from Peru, see JOSE HURTADO POZO, MANUAL DE 
DERECHO PENAL, PARTE GENERAL 381–394 (3d. ed. 2005); from Colombia, see 
FERNANDO VELAZQUEZ V., DERECHO PENAL, PARTE GENERAL 508–22 (4th ed. 
2009); from Costa Rica, see GUSTAVO CHAN MORA & JAVIER LLOBET 
RODRIGUEZ, FRANCISCO CASTILLO GONZALEZ Y EL DERCHO PENAL 
COSTARRICENSE, cited in HOMENAGE AL PROF. FRANCISCO CASTILLO GONZALEZ 
EN SUS 70 ANOS 38–39 (2014); from Argentina, see EUGENIO RAUL ZAFFARONI, 
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law model, most of these countries have developed a more compre-
hensive and deeper concept of the nature of conduct in criminal law, 
which is still evolving and undergoing scholarly inquiry.164 
Since the first half of the twentieth century, human conduct is no 
longer regarded by most civil law system specialists as a simple 
muscular contraction, but rather as an indivisible blend of objectiv-
ity and subjectivity.165 After a long process of theoretical transfor-
mation, especially since the normative theory of culpability,166 and 
even more so since the goal-oriented theory of conduct167 was for-
mulated, intent and negligence are no longer considered forms of 
                                                                                                             
TRATADO DE DERECHO PENAL, PARTE GENERAL, VOLUME 3 97–134 (Ediar 
1981); from Chile, see CURY URZÚA, supra note 160, at 249, 294; and from Spain, 
see SANTIAGO MIR PUIG, INTRODUCCION A LAS BASES DEL DERECHO PENAL 221 
(2d edition 2003). 
 164 CLAUSE ROXIN, STRAFRECHT, ALLGEMEINER TEIL, VOLUME 1 236–70 
(Verlag C.H. Beck München 2006). 
 165 See BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 162, at 50–53; see 
also HANS WELZEL, EL NUEVO SISTEMA DEL DERECHO PENAL 62 (1964). In Ar-
gentina, Professor Frías Caballero taught that the criminal offense is a set of in-
terdependent elements “and that each element is a function of the other” and that 
“each element has both an objective and a subjective aspect.” MARIANO CUNEO 
LIBARONA, FRIAS CABALLERO: SU CATEDRA SOBRE LA TEORIA DEL DELITO, in 
HOMENAJE AL PROFESOR DR. JORGE FRÍAS CABALLERO 139,141 (Colegio De 
Abogados Del Departemento Judicial La Plata 1998). 
 166 The normative theory of culpability started with Reinhard Frank in 1907 
(ÜBER DEN AUFBAU DES SCHULDBEGRIFFS (1907)) and was later developed by a 
string of scholars. For this theory, culpability is basically blameworthiness. The 
structure of culpability according to this theory is constituted by the following 
three elements: capacity of being culpable (not being insane or an infant); intent 
or negligence, which are the psychological links between actors and their conduct; 
and the normality of the attendant circumstances. This means that in a concrete 
situation, actors should have the power to act lawfully so that one can blame them 
if they act wrongfully. In other words, the attendant circumstances must warrant 
a fair expectation that actors behave in accordance with the law. 
 167 The theory of purposive action (teleological or goal-oriented action) was 
conceived by Hans Welzel, who defined it as an activity consciously oriented to-
wards a goal. This theory became the basis of the modern characterization of crim-
inal offenses. The advocates of the teleological or goal-oriented theory of action 
criticize the formulation of the normative theory of culpability mentioned in the 
previous footnote. They claim that since the normative theory includes intent and 
negligence as one of the elements composing the structure of culpability, it con-
fuses the value judgment of culpability with the valued object (negligent or inten-
tional action). Culpability therefore consists of a pure value judgment of blame-
worthiness, and intent and negligence are part of the conduct, which is the object 
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culpability, but part of the subjective phase of the definition of the 
criminal offense. 
In addition to the correspondence of a particular conduct with 
the definition of the criminal offense, both in its objective and sub-
jective phases, such conduct must also be wrongful and culpable in 
order to constitute a criminal offense.168 A particular conduct is 
wrongful when it contradicts legal norms protecting vital legal in-
terests and values169 that are significant enough to justify retributive 
consequences instead of mere compensatory ones.170 This is clear in 
the Vilar case, where the possible punishment may reach a twenty-
year sentence of imprisonment and criminal fines far exceeding the 
extent of the damages.171 Moreover, such wrongful conduct must 
also be culpable in the sense that the perpetrator must be personally 
blameworthy for the wrongful conduct.172 
                                                                                                             
of the value judgment. Therefore, intent and negligence are no longer elements in 
the structure of culpability, but elements belonging to the definition of the crimi-
nal offense to which the conduct should adjust. The teleological or goal-oriented 
theory of culpability revamps the structure of culpability, which is now composed 
of three elements. The first element is the capacity of culpability; that is, the gen-
eral capacity to understand the significance of one’s wrongdoing and to determine 
oneself according to such understanding (e.g., infants and the insane are not ca-
pable of culpability). The second element is the possibility to understand the sig-
nificance of one’s wrongdoing in a concrete situation. When actors not only lack 
the actual consciousness of their wrongdoing, but also lack the possibility of at-
taining it, they cannot be blamed (cases of mistake about the legal prohibition). 
The third element is the possibility to determine oneself in conformity with the 
requirements of the legal order. In other words, it is necessary that attendant cir-
cumstances warrant a fair expectation that actors act in harmony with the legal 
order to consider them blameworthy. In this respect, it is not fair to expect law-
abiding behavior in situations of duress, concealment of close relatives from crim-
inal persecution, and illegal superior orders. See generally H. WELZEL, DERECHO 
PENAL ALEMAN, PARTE GENERAL (11th ed. 1970). 
 168 See JESCHECK & WEIGEND, supra note 161, at 218. 
 169 German criminal law considers the theory of Rechtsgut as the basic tenet 
of criminal law. “Rechtsgut” can be translated as the vital interests and values of 
the individual and society that are protected by criminal law. 
 170 See JESCHECK & WEIGEND, supra note 161, at 256–60. 
 171 United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 95–97 (2nd Cir. 2013). 
 172 See WELZEL, supra note 167, at 197. 
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Within the context of securities fraud, the specific word “will-
fully” contained in § 32(a)173 means that the action externally de-
scribed in §10(b)174 must be committed with the consciousness of 
its wrongfulness.175 The Vilar court erroneously stated that “willful-
ness” has nothing to do with the text or the interpretation of 
§10(b).176 Quite the contrary, “willfully” indicates the specific sub-
jective requirement needed for the structural transformation of the 
conduct externally described in section 10(b) into the complex com-
bination of external and internal elements that actually constitute a 
particular criminal conduct.177 To understand this transformative 
role of the expression “willfulness,” one should of course connect it 
with the high degree of wrongfulness of which the perpetrator 
should be aware.178 In this context, the subjective requirement of 
                                                                                                             
 173 15 U.S.C § 78ff (2012). 
 174 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2012). 
 175 In the United States, the term “willfully” is surrounded with interpretive 
confusion. The Supreme Court has pointed out that the word “willful” is a “word 
of many meanings.” Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943). In the con-
text of securities fraud, however, the Ninth Circuit has interpreted this term cor-
rectly. The Ninth Circuit interpreted “willful” as “intentionally undertaking an act 
that one knows to be wrongful.” United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1188 
(9th Cir. 2004). This decision is case-specific and in the United States, neither 
courts nor scholars have categorized this concept within a comprehensive theory 
of the criminal offense. “Willfulness” has neither been related to the conduct nor 
to the values and interests protected by the criminalization of such conduct, as it 
is the case in the German model. 
 176 See Vilar, 729 F.3d at 75–76. 
 177 See supra note 165. 
 178 See supra note 161. The term “willfulness” (see supra note 175) as defined 
by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Tarallo, 380 F. 3d 1174, 1183 (2004), 
links the intentionality with the high degree of wrongfulness needed to transform 
the securities fraud into a criminal offense. The decision of Congress to make a 
behavior criminal implies the requirement of a serious culpable wrongdoing; that 
is, the willful conduct should contradict basic vital social values consisting in this 
case in the integrity of the financial market as a crucial part of the economy. While 
civil and administrative actions are available for the infringement of any rule un-
der the Securities Exchange Act, only a limited number are subject to criminal 
enforcement. For example, filing violations would be excluded from the latter. It 
is necessary that the culpability of the perpetrator should be based on a degree of 
wrongfulness enough to compromise the integrity of the financial market and to 
thus arouse the moral condemnation of society. 
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“willfulness” indicates a high degree of antisociality enough to jus-
tify the application of the criminal justice system.179 To criminally 
enforce a statute means that its infringement has attained such grav-
ity that it deserves the moral condemnation of all society.180 
We have already used theoretical German legal approaches to 
reformulate the notion of human conduct to challenge the Second 
Circuit’s assumption that the notion of conduct is the same in both 
civil and criminal contexts181 and to interpret the nature and scope 
of the word “willfully.” 
The adverb “willfully” is given a pivotal role in section 32(a)’s 
definition of the crime.182 It corresponds in American terminology 
to the mens rea of securities fraud.183 As mentioned earlier, some 
American scholars have noted insufficiencies in American law re-
garding this concept. These well-founded scholarly complaints jus-
tify the present article’s reliance on foreign legal systems in search 
for conceptual clarification. Consider, for instance, Michael L. Sei-
gel’s complaints.184 Seigel denounces the massive confusion related 
to the interpretation of the phrase mens rea185 and undertakes a re-
view of the multiple and conflicting interpretations of this key 
phrase, which determines whether the actor has committed a crime 
or not.186 
Seigel praises the Model Penal Code (“MPC”), published by the 
American Law Institute in 1962, for unifying and simplifying the 
common law’s mens rea terminology, and he recommends emphat-
ically its adoption in the field of securities-related criminal of-
fenses.187  It is true that the MPC has improved and unified mens rea 
                                                                                                             
 179 See supra note 178. 
 180 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 2 (5th ed. 2009). 
 181 United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 74 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 182 15 U.S.C § 78ff (2012). 
 183 See Leng-Chia Hung, Securities Markets—A Place to Get Rich Quick or a 
Quicksand Going Straight to Jail? The “Mens Rea” Required for Insider Trading 
Criminal Liability, 5 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 2 (2010). 
 184 Michael L. Seigel, Bringing Coherence to Mens Rea Analysis for Securi-
ties-Related Offences, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1563, 1569 (2006). 
 185 Id. at 1565. 
 186 See generally id.; see also Jeremy M. Miller, Mens Rea Quagmire: The 
Conscience or Consciousness of the Criminal Law?, 29 W. ST. U. L. REV. 21 
(2001). 
 187 Model Penal Code § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
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terminology; however, it has not reached the conceptual depth 
achieved by other legal systems since 1962.188 A comparative per-
spective might provide American scholarship with the intellectual 
instrument to better understand the role and significance of a particle 
such as “willfully” within the context of a statute that criminalizes 
behavior otherwise considered to be a mere civil or administrative 
wrong. The need for such a contribution can be inferred from Joshua 
Dressler’s insights into the ambiguity of the term mens rea.189 Alt-
hough apparently Professor Dressler is not aware of theoretical 
criminal law developments in the civil law world, or at least he does 
not refer to them, he intuitively understands some of the categories 
elaborated in these countries.190 
Dressler has clearly perceived that the words “mens rea” hide 
two different meanings: the “culpability” meaning and the “ele-
mental” one.191 According to the former, mens rea denotes a morally 
blameworthy state of mind, while the latter indicates “the particular 
mental state” elements included in the definition of certain criminal 
offenses.192 Such a perception has led to the reformulation of the 
concept of criminal offense in countries that follow the German 
model.193 
In German legal literature, which has influenced most civil law 
countries in the last half of the twentieth century, the notions of “ac-
tion,” “behavior,” and “conduct” are dealt with as inextricably 
linked with intent, as opposed to older approaches in which human 
beings were viewed as responsive machines.194 The expression 
                                                                                                             
 188 Originally, culpability was conceived as a nexus or psychological link be-
tween the actor and the act. This link manifested itself in two forms: intent and 
negligence. In the latest developments of criminal law theory, culpability became 
a pure judgment of blameworthiness composed of three elements: capacity of cul-
pability (i.e. sanity or age), the actual possibility of knowing the wrongfulness of 
the action, and the ability to conform the action to the requirements of the law. 
See WELZEL, supra note 167, at 214. 
 189 See DRESSLER, supra note 180, at 118–19. 
 190 See id. 
 191 See id. 
 192 See id. 
 193 Wolfgang Naucke, An Insider’s Perspective on the Significance of the Ger-
man Criminal Theory’s General System for Analyzing Criminal Acts, BYU L. REV. 
305 (1984); see also Dubber, supra note 90. 
 194 See GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 162, at 289. 
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“willfulness” cannot be seen, as in the Vilar decision, as a mere ap-
pendage that triggers the intervention of the criminal justice system; 
rather, it must be viewed as a crucial element in the definition of a 
crime, transforming the nature and substance of the defined conduct. 
In these new developments of criminal-law thought, human conduct 
is no longer conceived as “a willed muscular contraction” but as 
goal-oriented.195 Intent, therefore, traditionally defined as a form of 
culpability, becomes an essential component of the notion of con-
duct.196 Culpability, on the contrary, is a judgment about such con-
duct that takes place at a later stage of analysis.197 It consists of de-
termining the personal blameworthiness of the perpetrator, taking 
into account circumstances such as mental health, maturity, possi-
bility of knowing the transgressed legal precept, and absence of du-
ress.198 Dressler, as explained above, has picked up on the ambiguity 
of the word mens rea, used indifferently as a descriptive element of 
a particular state of mind or as culpability in the general sense of 
blameworthiness.199 This is to a certain extent an approximation to 
similar modern doctrinal developments in the civil law system.200 
The crime of securities fraud is actually defined in section 32(a), 
in which “willfulness” is an essential element of this definition. For 
the rest, it incorporates 10(b) by reference.201 Accordingly, it is mis-
leading to affirm, as Judge Cabranes does in Vilar, that the willful 
commission of the fraud does not relate to the conduct prescribed by 
                                                                                                             
 195 Id. at 269; see BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 162, at 51–
53. 
 196 See CURY URZÚA, supra note 160, at 249, 294. 
 197 See WELZEL, supra note 167, at 214. 
 198 See id. 
 199 See DRESSLER, supra note 180. 
 200 In the modern civil law system developments, intent has been removed 
from the notion of culpability and has become part of the notion of conduct and 
therefore of the definition of the offense. Culpability, on the other hand, is a sep-
arate element of the criminal offense considered in the last stage of the crime’s 
analysis consisting of a pure judgment of blameworthiness, as specified in note 
188. Dressler understands that, on the one hand, the word mens rea means intent 
as part of the definition of the offense, while, on the other hand, it refers to a 
general judgment of blameworthiness. 
 201 15 U.S.C § 78ff (2012). 
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section 10(b).202 Quite to the contrary, “willfully” is an essential el-
ement of the conduct, transmuting section 10(b) after its incorpora-
tion by reference to section 32(a).203 
The confusion of the court can be traced to the ambiguous nature 
of mens rea in the Anglo-American tradition and how this ambiguity 
“loops back and undermines our understanding of human action.”204 
Judge Cabranes erroneously concludes that proving willfulness 
has nothing to do with the text or interpretation of section 10(b).205 
He ignores that willfulness transforms the nature of the conduct. By 
using such an expression, the Exchange Act refers to a particular 
conduct that poses a social threat to the vital values and interests of 
the community and becomes the object of moral condemnation of a 
whole society.206 This is, however, just the beginning of our argu-
ment. Any homicide, rape, or larceny is criminal conduct subject to 
social condemnation and moral opprobrium, but the circumstances 
in themselves do not justify their extraterritorial application.207 
Bowman expressly underscores that many intrinsically local crimes 
fall within the territorial jurisdiction of the state and cannot be ap-
plied extraterritorially without an express mandate from Con-
gress.208 
Further inquiry into the governmental and social value protected 
by 32(a) combined with 10(b), that is, the integrity of the securities 
market, leads us to conclude that such value is similar to those val-
ues protected by the Supreme Court in Bowman and used to affirm 
                                                                                                             
 202 United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 75–76 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 203 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l, 78ff (2012). 
 204 GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 162, at 288. 
 205 Vilar, 729 F.3d at 75–76. 
 206 See DRESSLER, supra note 180, at 118–19. 
 207 To justify their extraterritorial application without an express congres-
sional mandate, it is necessary, using Chief Justice Taft’s words, that these “of-
fen[s]es ‘are such that to limit their [prosecution] to the strictly territorial jurisdic-
tion would be greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute.’” 
ALEJANDRO CHEHTMAN, THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
EXTRATERRITORIAL PUNISHMENT 76 (Oxford U. Press 2010) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 208 See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922). 
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the will of Congress to apply the criminal provision extraterritori-
ally.209 The globalization of securities markets has brought about its 
delocalization and, therefore, places it under the Bowman exception 
to the presumption against extraterritoriality.210 
After having determined that “willfulness” transforms the nature 
of the definition of fraud provided by section 10(b) into a criminal 
offense, the next step is to determine that the social value protected 
by such criminal provision rises to the nature of governmental inter-
est that, according to Bowman, justifies its extraterritorial applica-
tion. The Securities Exchange Act was basically enacted to protect 
investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitate 
capital formation necessary to sustain economic growth.211 The de-
localization of securities markets requires the extraterritorial appli-
cation of the Act to attain these goals. 
4. FOURTH CRITIQUE OF VILAR 
Here is Vilar’s last relevant proposition, followed by my cri-
tique: 
The government argues that criminal statutes 
‘are concerned with prohibiting individuals . . . 
from defrauding American investors and from 
using the infrastructure of American commerce 
to defraud investors’ and that applying the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality to criminal 
statutes ‘would create a broad immunity for crim-
inal conduct simply because the fraudulent 
                                                                                                             
 209 As for example, the environment in Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 
(1941), and the integrity of the bankruptcy proceeding in Stegeman v. United 
States, 400 U.S. 837 (1970). 
 210 See note 132; see also RYNGAERT, supra note 2, at 187. 
 211 “The mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is to protect 
investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital for-
mation.” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, The Investor’s Advocate: 
How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates 
Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Oct. 
22, 2015). The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 mentions in Section 12 that 
the purposes of the Act are the maintenance of fair and orderly markets and the 
protection of investors and the public interest. See Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, Pub. L. No. 112–158, § 12 (2012). 
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scheme culminates in a purchase or sale abroad.’ 
But much the same could be said of civil fraud 
statutes: Applying the presumption against extra-
territoriality immunizes thieves and swindlers 
from civil liability for defrauding Americans 
abroad.212 
To justify the application of Morrison to criminal cases, the Vi-
lar court considers that the strict application of the presumption 
against extraterritoriality has the same consequences in civil and 
criminal realms.213 If it were the same to dispense civil wrongdoers 
from liability as to immunize perpetrators from criminal responsi-
bility for a certain behavior, there would be no reason to criminalize 
such behavior in the first place. There is a fundamental difference 
between reduced protection of individuals against personal damages 
and reduced protection of society against attacks to its vital social 
interests and values, such as the integrity of financial markets. This 
qualitative difference is reflected in the difference between civil and 
criminal law procedures. Securities fraud can reach such gravity as 
to concern not only the direct victim, but also the entire society.214 
The award of compensatory damages results in a money transfer 
from one person to another, while a criminal law conviction implies 
the moral condemnation made by an entire society. 
Business-related criminal law typically protects supra-individ-
ual vital interests and values, such as the integrity of securities mar-
kets.215 In a globalized economy, these legally protected collective 
interests have experienced such a delocalization that, to be mean-
ingfully protected, they can hardly be constrained by strict territorial 
limitations. 
Another aspect of the distinction between civil and criminal law 
that justifies its separate treatment regarding extraterritoriality is the 
motivation and purposes of private litigants as opposed to those of 
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public prosecutors.216 Morrison’s merit was to curtail the abusive 
use of the American judicial system by Australian plaintiffs in an 
intrinsically Australian case.217 This case was an illustration of Lord 
Denning’s remark: “[a]s a moth is attracted to the light, so is a liti-
gant drawn to the United States.”218 Foreign litigants often elect the 
United States forum, searching for handsome jury awards, punitive 
damages, contingency fees, ample discovery, and other attractions 
offered by American courts.219 In private actions, profit considera-
tions command the forum selection and eclipse any public policy 
considerations.220 
A criminal action initiated by a public plaintiff, such as the De-
partment of Justice, is unlikely to ignore potential international con-
flicts and will try to avoid them. The main reason supporting the 
presumption against extraterritoriality is dispelled when a branch of 
the United States government seriously concerned with avoiding in-
ternational friction prosecutes the securities fraudsters.221 This is the 
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reason why the Dodd-Frank Act attempted to reintroduce the “con-
duct” and “effects” tests for public enforcement of the United States 
law, whether by the SEC or the DOJ.222 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Vilar decision incorrectly applies the Morrison holding to a 
very different factual and legal setting. Morrison is about a private 
law class action involving an evident abuse of the United States ju-
dicial system by Australian litigants.223 This abuse led to a unani-
mous rejection by the district and circuit federal courts as well as by 
the totality of the Supreme Court justices.224 In contrast, Vilar is 
about an action brought by the Department of Justice against trans-
national criminals to preserve social values of the highest rank, such 
as financial market integrity and investors’ trust.225 The severity of 
the punishment, imprisonment of up to twenty years and significant 
fines, demonstrates the gravity of the crime for which Vilar and his 
accomplice were accused.226 Unlike the National Australia Bank 
agents in Morrison, Vilar and his accomplice were not trying to gain 
U.S. jurisdiction, but rather were attempting to avoid it.227 
The Supreme Court’s Morrison decision is silent on whether its 
interpretation of the Securities Exchange Act covers criminal pros-
ecutions.228 What’s more, Justice Stevens’s concurrence was in the 
understanding that public enforcement of the Exchange Act’s anti-
fraud provisions was not included in the holding.229 
The Vilar court extended Morrison’s restrictive holding to the 
criminal antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act, disregarding es-
sential substantive and procedural differences between the civil and 
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criminal law ambits.230 The Court further ignored the dynamic char-
acter and the purposes of the Securities Exchange Act in a world of 
internationalized financial markets.231 
Despite its wholehearted adherence to Morrison’s interpretation 
of the Act, Vilar recognized that United States v. Bowman had sur-
vived Morrison.232 Such recognition opens a significant crack in the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, a seemingly iron wall in Jus-
tice Scalia’s own statutory interpretative methodology. 
After undermining the presumption against extraterritoriality by 
recognizing the validity of the Bowman exception, Vilar tried to 
backtrack by giving the narrowest possible interpretation of Bow-
man.233 This artificial conclusion betrays not only Bowman’s words, 
but also its spirit. 
It is important to bear in mind that the presumption against ex-
traterritoriality is not a constitutional principle; it is a canon of in-
terpretation with dubious precedential value.234 This is a case in 
which Morrison’s supportive rationale should not be binding, and 
its interpretative methodology should not be adopted—all the more 
so, as in this case, when they are applied to new and different factual 
contexts. 
Statutory interpretative methodology is not part of the holding. 
“[U]nder the doctrine of stare decisis a case is important only for 
what it decides—for the ‘what,’ not for the ‘why,’ and not for the 
‘how.’”235 In this respect, Randy J. Kozel warns against precedents 
defined “capaciously and inclusively in constraining future courts,” 
as is often the case in contemporary federal practice.236 Morrison is 
an example of this unwarranted broadening of the holding’s scope. 
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Scalia himself believes that dicta are “binding upon neither” the 
Supreme Court nor the inferior courts, and that they do not deserve 
stare decisis weight.237 Moreover, as Judge Leval pointed out, “[t]he 
Supreme Court’s dicta are not law,” and judges “may not treat Su-
preme Court’s dictum as dispositive.”238 Although Scalia empha-
sizes that the presumption against extraterritoriality has historical 
lineage,239 such circumstance does not prove binding force.240 
Furthermore, sections 10(b) and 32(a) of the Securities and Ex-
change Act should be interpreted systematically and in accordance 
with the purposes of the Securities Exchange Act.241 The definition 
of the crime prosecuted in United States v. Vilar is contained in sec-
tion 32(a).242 As a blanket provision, this section incorporates by 
reference section 10(b), which provides the external description of 
the criminalized behavior.243 Moreover, section 32(a) criminalizes 
securities fraud by punishing it with a severity commensurate to the 
values protected by such criminal provision.244 
The term “willfully” in section 32(a) is inextricably related to 
the conduct externally described in section 10(b) and incorporated 
by reference into the criminal provision of section 32(a).245 The law 
requires a specific state of mind when securities frauds have reached 
the magnitude that justifies their criminalization (that is, threatening 
both market integrity and public wealth).246 The protection of these 
vital social values that are instrumental to the workings of the econ-
omy led the legislator to create a new criminal provision. This pro-
vision includes the more stringent requirement of consciousness of 
a type of wrongfulness, the magnitude of which explains such crim-
inalization. Perpetrators must be aware of the contradiction of their 
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behavior with vital social values to an extent that justifies their crim-
inal law protection under section 32(a) of the Securities Exchange 
Act.247 
Therefore, in the context of securities frauds, the adverb “will-
fully” stands for a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance 
made unlawful by section 10b of the Exchange Act, carried out with 
the awareness of its inherent highly detrimental nature. The magni-
tude of the action’s harmfulness should be measured against its ap-
titude to compromise the integrity of the financial market, thus 
reaching the point that had led Congress to criminalize it in the first 
place.248 “Willfully,” therefore, is not a mere appendage discon-
nected from the conduct externally described by section 10(b), as 
Vilar shortsightedly believes. 
Moreover, it is precisely the transnational nature of the values of 
market integrity and public wealth protected by section 32(a) that 
justifies the extraterritorial application of the Securities Exchange 
Act antifraud provisions. The globalization of financial markets reg-
ulated by the Securities Exchange Act demands a dynamic interpre-
tation of the Act, in light of its “present societal, political, and legal 
context.”249 
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